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Abstract This study surveys active real estate brokers on their involvement
in afﬁnity programs and referral/relocation networks. Some
survey results regarding afﬁnity involvement are: (1) 13% of
respondents reported afﬁnity afﬁliations, 75% reported no
afﬁliations and 12% indicated plans to become involved within
the next year; (2) afﬁnity relationships were most often with
membership organizations, corporations and professional
organizations; and (3) the primary afﬁnity beneﬁts were
commission reductions, special mortgage packages and
discounted closing services. An empirical income model shows
that afﬁnity afﬁliation has a positive effect on broker income.
Probit models show that: (1) participation in afﬁnity
arrangements is more likely for larger ﬁrms and national
franchises; and (2) large ﬁrms are more likely to participate in
a larger number of afﬁnity relationships.
Introduction
Real estate ﬁrms have evolved to meet changing economic conditions. For
example, some years ago brokers began paying and receiving referral fees to
receive and send prospective home buyers and sellers. In the early days of referral
fees, the transferred employee typically received little or no support from the
employer for selling or buying a home. However, a depressed real estate market
in the early 1980s forced employers to revise their policies on relocation beneﬁts.
At the same time, franchise ﬁrms began creating relocation networks between
their subsidiaries and relocation networks began to evolve between independent
or non-franchise ﬁrms.
The economics of the real estate business changed again in the 1990s. As
relocation costs increased, corporations and relocation management companies
began charging referral fees as a way to reduce these costs. Evolving from this
process is the afﬁnity group. Afﬁnity relationships give commission discounts,
rebates or other goods and services to individuals who belong to or are employed
by professional or trade associations, unions or companies that have an agreement
with a real estate ﬁrm. Examples of afﬁnity groups include USAA, the AFL-CIO338  Sirmans and Macpherson
and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). United Airlines,
Sears, United Parcel Service and Prudential Insurance Company are examples of
companies that have provided some form of afﬁnity program for their employees.1
Afﬁnity groups have various ways of distributing beneﬁts to their members and
to afﬁnity group partners. For example, American Airlines has an afﬁnity
partnership with PHH Real Estate Services. The airline awards frequent ﬂier miles
to members of its Aadvantage Program when they buy or sell a home through
brokers at PHH. The participating brokers pay a referral fee to PHH. Also, real
estate ﬁrms have entered into arrangements with local and national retailers to
provide discounts or coupons to consumers who utilize their brokerage services.
This study uses an ordinary least squares model to examine the effect of afﬁnity
participation on real estate broker income. The article uses probit modeling to
examine the likelihood of brokerage ﬁrms participating in afﬁnity programs and
referral/relocation networks.
 Affinity Programs
There are numerous examples of afﬁnity programs. For example, an organization
may license its name and /or logo to be used on vending machines and receive
a percentage of the gross sales. An organization, such as the Sierra Club, may
contract with a ﬁnancial institution to issue cards to members or supporters of the
organization. Each time a sale is made with the card, the organization receives a
percentage of the charge. Likewise, an organization may contract with a
telecommunications company to market rechargeable phone cards to the
organization’s members. The organization receives a percentage of all recharges
to the phone cards used by its members. The organizations may be tax-exempt
organizations seeking to increase their income by endorsing products of a for-
proﬁt company. A properly structured deal will classify this income as royalty
income and will not be taxable as unrelated business income. The income must
be passive in nature and cannot include compensation for services rendered by
the exempt organization. Other examples of programs include car rental discounts,
equipment discounts, communication packages, shipping discounts, life insurance
discounts and disability insurance discounts.
Real estate afﬁnity programs are typically available to members of associations
such as credit unions, banks and airlines. Through their ‘‘afﬁnity’’ with these
organizations, consumers can receive a savings on their commissions through
either a cash rebate or other beneﬁts such as frequent ﬂier miles. A typical program
will rebate from hundreds to thousands of dollars back to the consumer for using
a speciﬁc real estate broker or mortgage lender. In a typical afﬁnity program, a
member of an organization will be urged to use an approved agent when selling
a home. The consumer is assured a discount on the real estate commission.
Regulators have been concerned about afﬁnity programs because an unlicensed
participant is in the middle of the transaction and they can only discipline license-Affinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  339
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holders. The Coalition for Consumer Choice in Real Estate (CCCRE) was
organized in 1999 to defend the presence of afﬁnity programs in real estate. It
has worked to combat rules that prohibit the paying of commission rebates to
consumers because it believes afﬁnity programs are a business option that saves
money for both brokers and consumers. CCCRE companies include Cendant
Mobility, Costco, USAA and American Airlines. In the recent past, beneﬁt
programs have been offered in over forty states but several states have tried to
restrict the offering of these programs. Historically, states that have restricted
beneﬁts include Oklahoma, New Jersey, Kentucky, Idaho and Kansas.
Participating agents are willing to reduce their commission rates on the premise
that the dollars will be made up in a larger number of deals. In Realty Times,
November 23, 1999, Steve Baird, President of Chicago-based Baird and Warner
Realtors, estimated that since their inception, real estate afﬁnity programs have
produced well over $30 million in cash and frequent ﬂier miles beneﬁts to more
than 60,000 consumers. He believes that consumers beneﬁt from move consulting,
cash bonuses and other beneﬁts while real estate brokers can cut the cost of
attracting customers and enhance their offerings.
In 1998, the Center for Real Estate Research at Washington State University
surveyed real estate licensees in Washington. With regard to afﬁnity groups, the
study found that signiﬁcantly less than half of Washington’s real estate licensees
were involved in afﬁnity relationships. Corporate afﬁnity programs such as airlines
or insurance companies were the most frequently encountered and most
respondents indicated that afﬁnity relationships had no impact on their business.
In 1997, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) surveyed a national sample
of real estate licensees regarding afﬁnity relationships. The survey found that 75%
of respondents were not actively involved with afﬁnity groups. Of those who were
involved, 48% reported being involved in more than one relationship. Thirty-eight
percent said that afﬁnity afﬁliation had no effect on proﬁtability while forty-one
percent said they did not know if it did or not. The survey found that corporations
providing services to customers (airlines, insurance companies, etc.) were the
primary afﬁliates of real estate brokerage ﬁrms.
The primary focus of this study is afﬁnity programs in Florida. Afﬁnity
arrangements in Florida appear to be similar to those in other parts of the country.
Also, the major issue of regulation prohibiting the sharing of real estate fees with
unlicensed entities seems to be true in Florida as in other parts of the country.
 Broker Income
One aspect of this study is to measure the effect of afﬁnity programs on broker
income. A number of previous studies (see Follain, Lutes and Meier, 1987; Crellin,
Frew and Jud, 1988; Glower and Hendershott, 1988; and Sirmans and Swicegood,
1997, 2000) have examined the determinants of broker income. Variables that have
been shown to positively affect income include hours worked, education,340  Sirmans and Macpherson
experience, size of ﬁrm, living in a metropolitan area, professional designations,
use of computer and job satisfaction. Variables that have been shown to have a
negative effect on income include being a female, specializing in residential sales,
age and perceived image. Variables that have not been shown to signiﬁcantly affect
broker income include source of prelicensing education, club membership and
number of hours spent reading real estate-related literature. This study seeks to
determine whether afﬁnity programs should be added to the list of variables
affecting broker income.
 Objective and Approach
This study analyzes the effect of afﬁnity groups on the real estate brokerage
business. According to a 1998 study by the NAR, brokerage ﬁrms were more
likely to be involved in afﬁnity relationships in 1997 than in 1995. The NAR
study reports that, nationally, about 25% of brokerage ﬁrms are afﬁliated with an
afﬁnity group. That was up from 16% in 1995. Also, another 4% of brokers
indicated plans to afﬁliate within the next twelve months. Brokers that participate
in afﬁnity relationships were more likely to be afﬁliated with more than one
afﬁnity group.
A mail survey (available from the authors on request) was sent to a random sample
of 3,000 active real estate brokers in Florida. The original 3,000 mailing went to
500 real estate brokerage ﬁrm managers and to 2,500 active real estate brokers.
A follow-up mailing of 1,000 surveys was sent to non-respondents. A total of 310
responses were received. Some demographic information was obtained along with
information concerning afﬁnity groups and referral fees. Summary statistics for
the data are given in Exhibit 1. The next section gives a proﬁle of afﬁnity and
referral participation. Questions addressed in the survey include: (1) does your
ﬁrm participate in afﬁnity arrangements; (2) with what afﬁnity groups does your
ﬁrm afﬁliate; (3) what beneﬁts does your ﬁrm provide to buyers and/or sellers;
and (4) what effect has afﬁliation had on proﬁtability, activity, etc.
The analysis of the survey data is done in two parts: (1) an empirical model of
the effect of afﬁnity programs on broker income; and (2) a probit model of whether
a broker is involved in an afﬁnity relationship. Also, ordered probit models of the
number of afﬁnity relationships are estimated.
Statistical analysis of referral and relocation afﬁliation similar to the afﬁnity
relationship is also performed. Probit models of whether the respondent’s ﬁrm is
part of a national referral/relocation network are estimated. In addition, an analysis
of the number of referrals, the conversion rate on incoming referrals and the
percentage of the ﬁrm’s revenue from incoming referral/relocation transactions
are conducted.Affinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  341
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Exhibit 1  Summary Statistics
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Income 208 $69,786 $63,596 0.00 $400,000
Nonwhite 250 0.088 0.284 0.00 1.00
Male 252 0.702 0.458 0.00 1.00
Experience 255 21.58 10.26 4.00 54.00
Hours Worked 249 37.20 20.69 0.00 100.00
Afﬁnity Participation 257 0.132 0.339 0.00 1.00
# Afﬁnity Arrangements* 37 2.081 0.924 1.00 4.00
Member Referral Network 281 0.121 0.335 0.00 1.00
# Referral Transactions* 36 2.917 1.680 0.00 5.00
Firm Size 1–5 257 0.755 0.431 0.00 1.00
Firm Size 6–10 257 0.113 0.317 0.00 1.00
Firm Size 11–20 257 0.051 0.219 0.00 1.00
Firm Size 21–30 257 0.027 0.163 0.00 1.00
Firm Size 31 257 0.054 0.227 0.00 1.00
Independent Firm 257 0.895 0.307 0.00 1.00
National Franchise 257 0.093 0.291 0.00 1.00
National Firm 257 0.012 0.108 0.00 1.00
Small/Non MSA 257 0.478 0.500 0.00 1.00
Daytona 257 0.027 0.163 0.00 1.00
Jacksonville 257 0.027 0.163 0.00 1.00
Melbourne 257 0.035 0.184 0.00 1.00
Miami 257 0.171 0.377 0.00 1.00
Orlando 257 0.058 0.235 0.00 1.00
Sarasota 257 0.027 0.163 0.00 1.00
Tampa 257 0.121 0.326 0.00 1.00
West Palm 257 0.054 0.227 0.00 1.00
Notes: The number of observations varies with the response rate. This variation is reﬂected in the
estimation exhibits that follow.
*Means only for those respondents responding positively to afﬁnity afﬁliation or membership in a
referral/relocation network.342  Sirmans and Macpherson
 Broker Involvement in Affinity Programs and Referral/
 Relocation Networks
The survey measured a number of characteristics of real estate brokers and their
involvement with afﬁnity programs and relocation/referral networks.2 These
characteristics included: (1) demographic information such as age, gender,
experience, income, etc.; (2) ﬁrm characteristics such as size and type; (3) afﬁnity
relationships; and (4) referral or relocation afﬁliation.3
Relative to afﬁnity afﬁliation and referral/relocation networks, some of the results
from the survey are:
1. Thirteen percent of respondents indicated an afﬁnity afﬁliation while
12% indicated a plan to become involved in afﬁnity programs within the
next year.
2. Thirty-eight respondents indicated some association with afﬁnity groups.
Of these, 29% indicated involvement with one group while 47%
indicated involvement with two to four groups.
3. Twenty-four percent indicated involvement with ﬁve or more groups.
The respondents reporting afﬁnity relationships were most often involved
with membership organizations, corporations that provide services to
customers and professional associations. A smaller proportion was
associated with credit card issuers.
4. The main afﬁnity beneﬁts provided to sellers were percentage reductions
in commissions and special mortgage packages.
5. The main afﬁnity beneﬁts provided to buyers were special mortgage
packages, commission reductions, discounted closing services, and other
goods and services.
6. Thirty-eight percent of those responding indicated that afﬁnity afﬁliation
had increased proﬁtability while 21% reported a decrease. Forty-one
percent reported no effect on proﬁtability.
7. Of those responding, 56% reported an increase in sales agents’
productivity while seven percent indicated a decrease. Thirty-seven
percent reported no effect on productivity.
8. Of those responding, 44% reported an increase in the ﬁrm’s listing
activity because of afﬁnity afﬁliation while 56% indicated no effect.
9. Of those responding, 47% indicated that they learned of the afﬁnity
relationship before the ﬁrst meeting while 27% learned at the ﬁrst
meeting. Only 27% learned of the relationship at or after contract
signing.
10. Of a total of 290 respondents, only 12% reported an afﬁliation with a
national referral or relocation network and 1% were considering it.
Eighty-one percent were not members but 6% indicated that they were
not members but received occasional business.Affinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  343
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 Empirical Analysis
To examine the effect of afﬁnity programs on real estate brokerage, the empirical
analysis is done in two parts. First, an income model is estimated to test the effect
of afﬁnity programs on broker income. Then, probit models are used to measure
the probability of participation in an afﬁnity arrangement. Probit models are also
used to measure the probability of participation in a referral/relocation network.
The Income Model




 ƒ(GENDER, EXPERIENCE, RACE,
HOURS WORKED, TYPE OF FIRM, SIZE OF FIRM,
LOCATION, AFFINITY PARTICIPATION), (1)
where:
GENDER  The gender of the broker (Male  0, Female 
1);
EXPERIENCE  The number of years work experience for the
broker;
RACE  The race of the broker (White  0, Nonwhite 
1);
HOURS WORKED  The number of hours that the broker works per
week;
TYPE OF FIRM  The type of brokerage ﬁrm (Franchise  0,
Independent  1);
FIRM SIZE  The number of licensees afﬁliated with the
brokerage ﬁrm (ﬁve categories of ﬁrm size were
created: 1–5, 6–10, 11–20, 21–30 and 31);
LOCATION  The location of the brokerage ﬁrm (the responses
were grouped into the following categories: no/
small MSA, Daytona, Jacksonville, Melbourne,
Miami, Orlando, Sarasota, Tampa, West Palm);
and
AFFINITY PARTICIPATION  Participation in an afﬁnity arrangement (Yes  1,
No  0).
As Exhibit 1 shows, the average income was $69,786 with an average number of
hours worked per week of thirty-seven. Seventy percent of the respondents were344  Sirmans and Macpherson






Experience Squared 0.001 1.21
ln(Hours Worked) 0.467 3.71*
6–10 Licensees 0.050 0.24
11–20 Licensees 0.507 3.67*
21–30 Licensees 0.047 0.18
31 Licensees 0.566 2.16*
Independent Firm 0.372 2.44*
Daytona Beach 0.179 0.52
Jacksonville 0.179 0.77
Melbourne 0.291 0.98
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 0.387 1.86*
Orlando 0.201 0.85
Sarasota 0.249 1.25
Tampa–St. Petersburg 0.014 0.06
West Palm Beach 0.645 2.96*
Afﬁnity Participation 0.409 2.45*
Adj. R2 20.57
Notes: Dependent variable  ln(Broker Income). N  184.
*Statistically signiﬁcance at the 10% level. The standard errors have been corrected for
heterosedasticity using the White correction.
male and 91% were Caucasian. The respondents had average work experience in
real estate of twenty-one years. Thirteen percent of the respondents were actively
involved in afﬁnity arrangements. Seventy-ﬁve percent of respondents worked in
a ﬁrm with ﬁve or less licensees and eighty-nine percent worked in independent
ﬁrms that are not franchised. About 48% of respondents lived in areas that are
small or no metropolitan areas. The largest number of respondents (17%) from a
major metropolitan area was from Miami.
Income Model Results
Estimation results from the income model are given in Exhibit 2. Income is
positively related to the number of hours worked, ﬁrm size, working for aAffinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  345
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Exhibit 3  Probit Model of Probability of Participation in Afﬁnity Arrangements
Variable Estimate t-Stat.
Constant 0.184 8.50*
6–10 Licensees 0.079 1.99*
11–20 Licensees 0.107 1.84
21–30 Licensees 0.034 0.42
31 Licensees 0.166 2.78*
National Franchise 0.146 3.17*
National Company 0.066 0.60
Daytona Beach 0.118 1.72
Jacksonville 0.035 0.43
Melbourne 0.048 0.73
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 0.085 1.73
Orlando 0.016 0.30
Sarasota 0.849 0.00
Tampa–St. Petersburg 0.090 1.44
West Palm Beach 0.016 0.24
Scale Factor 0.122
Notes: Dependent variable: 1  Afﬁnity Participation, 0  Nonparticipant. Sample size  257. The
estimate is the estimated effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability
that a ﬁrm with characteristics equal to the sample mean participates in an afﬁnity arrangement. The
partial derivative divided by the scale factor yields the associated probit coefﬁcient. The data source is
the Florida Real Estate Licensee Afﬁnity Group and Referral/Relocation Participation Survey.
Observations with missing values have been deleted.
*A statistically signiﬁcant estimate at the 5% level.
non-franchised ﬁrm and, in some cases, location. Income for females is
signiﬁcantly less than income for males. The afﬁnity variable has a positive effect
on broker income.5 The coefﬁcient of 0.409 indicates that brokers involved in
afﬁnity arrangements earn, on average, about 50% more than brokers who are not
involved.6 This result is interesting compared to the survey responses. Only 38%
of respondents indicated that afﬁnity afﬁliations resulted in increased proﬁtability
while 41% believed they had no effect.
Probit Model Results
In order to more closely examine the involvement of brokerage ﬁrms with afﬁnity
programs and referral/relocation networks, probit models are estimated using the
two binary response variables (i.e., whether in an afﬁnity arrangement and whether346  Sirmans and Macpherson
Exhibit 4  Ordered Probit Model of the Number of Afﬁnity Arrangements
Variable Estimate t-Stat.
Constant 1.854 3.81
6–10 Licensees 0.715 1.09
11–20 Licensees 0.264 0.33
21–30 Licensees 1.688 1.58
31 Licensees 1.635 2.22*
National Franchise 0.185 0.31
National Company 0.827 0.78
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 1.315 2.08*
Orlando 0.097 0.17
Tampa–St. Petersburg 1.016 1.44
Constant for Group 2 0.726 2.42*
Constant for Group 3 2.381 5.60*
Notes: Dependent variable  number of groups of afﬁnity participation. Sample size  37.
*A statistically signiﬁcant estimate at the 5% level.
in a referral/relocation network). Also, to formally examine the categorical
variables (such as the number of afﬁnity arrangements), multivariate ordered probit
models are used. Ordered probit models may be more useful than ordinary least
squares regression models for two reasons. First, the range covered by each
category varies. Ordinary least squares regression does not account for this and
treats the difference between categories 1 and 2 the same as the difference between
categories 2 and 3. Second, ordinary least squares regression can generate
predicted values outside the possible range (for example, a negative number of
afﬁnity arrangements). The use of ordered probit eliminates both of these
problems.
The ordered probit model assumes this relationship:
ƒ(Prob(Y  j))    X for j  1, ..., k, (2) j
where the response of the variable Y is measured in one of k  1 different
categories, j are k intercept parameters and  is a vector of slope parameters not
including the intercept term. The model assumes that 1  2  3 ...  k. This
model restricts the predicted values to be in the range covered in the dependent
value and permits each response in Y to be treated differently.Affinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  347
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Exhibit 5  Probit Model of Probability off Participation in a National Referral/Relocation Network
Variable Estimate t-Stat.
Constant 0.235 7.59*
6–10 Licensees 0.045 0.99
11–20 Licensees 0.092 1.50
21–30 Licensees 0.038 0.44
31 Licensees 0.298 4.16*
National Franchise 0.337 5.50*
National Company 0.049 0.47
Daytona Beach 0.140 2.09*
Jacksonville 0.142 2.16*
Melbourne 0.011 0.09
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 0.020 0.31
Orlando 0.116 2.33*
Sarasota 0.022 0.14
Tampa–St. Petersburg 0.052 1.08
West Palm Beach 0.064 1.18
Scale Factor 0.098
Notes: Dependent variable: 1  Participation, 0  Nonparticipant. Sample size  281. The estimate
is the estimated effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that a ﬁrm
with characteristics equal to the sample mean participates in a national referral/relocation network.
The partial derivative divided by the scale factor yields the associated probit coefﬁcient. The data
source is the Florida Real Estate Licensee Afﬁnity Group and Referral/Relocation Participation Survey.
Observations with missing values have been deleted.
*A statistically signiﬁcant estimate at the 5% level.
Exhibit 3 provides the results of the probit model measuring the probability of
participation in an afﬁnity arrangement. The dependent variable is whether (yes/
no) the ﬁrm participates in an afﬁnity arrangement. The ﬁrst set of variables in
the model is the size of the ﬁrm. The omitted reference group is size 1-5 licensees.
Two categories are signiﬁcant: the 6-10 group and the 31 category. This indicates
that ﬁrms of this size were 7.9 and 16.6 percentage points, respectively, more
likely to participate in an afﬁnity arrangement than ﬁrms of other sizes.
The second set of variables measures whether the company is a national franchise,
etc. The omitted reference group is an independent company. The variable for
national franchise is signiﬁcant indicating that a franchise company was 14.6
percentage points more likely than other types of companies to participate in
afﬁnity arrangements.348  Sirmans and Macpherson
Exhibit 6  Ordered Probit Model of the Number of Referral Transactions
Variable Estimate t-Stat.
Constant 1.269 2.52*
6–10 Licensees 1.372 2.02*
11–20 Licensees 0.306 0.47
21–30 Licensees 1.252 1.46
31 Licensees 2.597 3.42*
National Franchise 0.921 1.74
National Company 1.340 1.26
Miami–Fort Lauderdale 0.677 1.09
Orlando 0.415 0.66
Tampa–St. Petersburg 0.025 0.04
Constant for group 2 0.468 2.13*
Constant for group 3 1.208 3.80*
Constant for group 4 1.684 4.82*
Constant for group 5 2.894 5.85*
Note: Dependent variable is the number of groups of referral participation. Sample size  36. The
estimate for the each explanatory variable is the ordered probit coefﬁcient for the number of referral
transactions. The constants for groups 2 to group 5 are the constants that must be added to the
reference group constant to obtain the appropriate regression line for that group. The data source is
the Florida Real Estate Licensee Afﬁnity Group and Referral/Relocation Participation Survey. The
sample includes observations that indicate they participate in a national referral/relocation network.
*A statistically signiﬁcant estimate at the 5% level.
The third set of variables measures location. Small MSAs or no MSA is the
omitted reference group. None of the location variables are signiﬁcant indicating
that the probability of participating in an afﬁnity group was not location sensitive.
Overall, the results show that the probability of participating in afﬁnity
arrangements was somewhat sensitive to the size of the ﬁrm and whether the ﬁrm
is an independent or a franchise, but not to location.
Exhibit 4 provides results from the ordered probit model measuring the number
of afﬁnity arrangements relative to ﬁrm characteristics. Only a couple of variables
are signiﬁcant. They indicate that large ﬁrms with 31 licensees were more likely
to have signiﬁcantly more afﬁnity arrangements than smaller ﬁrms. With location,
ﬁrms in the Miami–Ft. Lauderdale area were more likely to have less afﬁnity
arrangements than ﬁrms in other areas of the state.
Overall, the results show that large ﬁrms were more likely to participate in a
greater number of afﬁnity arrangements than smaller ﬁrms but, in general, theAffinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  349
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number of arrangements was not sensitive to location or type of ﬁrm (franchise
or independent).
Exhibit 5 provides results for the probit model examining participation in a
national referral/relocation network. Large ﬁrms 31 were 29.8 percentage points
more likely to participate in these programs. Also, ﬁrms that were national
franchises were 33.7 percentage points more likely to participate. Firms in some
areas of the state were more likely to participate than ﬁrms in other areas. Firms
located in Daytona Beach, Jacksonville and Orlando were more likely to
participate in referral programs.
Overall, the results show that participation in a national referral/relocation
network was more likely for large ﬁrms, national franchise ﬁrms and ﬁrms in
Daytona Beach, Jacksonville and Orlando.
Exhibit 6 provides the results for the ordered probit model measuring the number
of referral transactions relative to ﬁrm characteristics. The results show that larger
ﬁrms (31) were more likely to have a higher number of referral transactions
than smaller ﬁrms. However, the number of referrals was not sensitive to type of
ﬁrm (franchise or independent) or location.
 Conclusion
This study uses a survey of Florida real estate brokers to measure participation in
afﬁnity programs and referral/relocation networks. A model of broker income
shows that afﬁnity afﬁliation has a positive effect on broker income. Probit models
are used to examine brokerage ﬁrm involvement in afﬁnity programs and referral/
relocation networks. Overall, the results for the probit models show: (1)
participation in afﬁnity arrangements is more likely for larger ﬁrms and national
franchises but is not sensitive to location within the state; (2) large ﬁrms are more
likely to participate in a larger number of afﬁnity relationships but the number of
relationships does not vary by type of ﬁrm or location of the ﬁrm; (3) large ﬁrms
and national franchise ﬁrms are more likely to participate in national referral/
relocation networks and this participation is somewhat location sensitive, and (4)
the number of referral transactions in which a ﬁrm participates is not sensitive to
type of ﬁrm or location of ﬁrm but larger ﬁrms are more likely to have more
referrals.
It is important to clarify the afﬁnity participation issue so as to determine whether
or not it is an effective marketing tool. On the one hand, groups such as the
CCCRE have formed to defend the presence of afﬁnity programs. Arguments are
made as to the beneﬁts of the program to the real estate industry and its viability
as a business option that saves money for both brokers and consumers. On the
other hand, some brokers complain that afﬁnity programs force them to cut their
commissions to compete for business. Also, regulators do not like the presence
of someone unlicensed in the middle of a real estate transaction. This study has
taken steps to clarify some of the issues surrounding afﬁnity programs.350  Sirmans and Macpherson
 Endnotes
1 For a more detailed discussion of afﬁnity relationships, see 1997 Real Estate Brokerage
Industry Practices: Afﬁnity and Referral/Relocation Relationships prepared for the
Afﬁnity and Relocation Working Group Business Issues Committee of the National
Association of Realtors, April 1998.
2 It may be argued that one knows the answer to the question of the effect of afﬁnity
programs a priori. Programs must be at least perceived as proﬁtable or they would not
exist. Also, one might question the focus on brokers as opposed to the ﬁrm itself. In
essence, the ﬁrm is the brokers. Most licensees act as independent contractors and would
have little incentive to participate in afﬁnity programs if they were not perceived as
worthwhile. Thus, while data was collected on ﬁrm characteristics, the major focus was
on the brokers themselves.
3 For a full discussion of the survey results, see Sirmans and Macpherson (2000).
4 The speciﬁcation of the regression model follows from the literature on broker income.
Not all variables in previous studies were measured in the current survey. In any case,
the major focus is on afﬁliation programs.
5 The model was also used to test other variables dealing with afﬁnity arrangements and
referral networks. No signiﬁcant relationships were found. For example, the number of
afﬁnity relationships had no signiﬁcant effect on income. Neither did the type of afﬁnity
relationships. Also, being a member of a referral/relocation network had no effect on
income.
6 To calculate the effect, take e
0.409 –1 0.505.
 References
Crellin, G. E., J. R. Frew and G. D. Jud, The Earnings of REALTORS: Some Empirical
Evidence, Journal of Real Estate Research, 1988, 3:2, 69–78.
Follain, J. R., T. Lutes and D. A. Meier, Why Do Some Real Estate Salespeople Earn More
Than Others?, Journal of Real Estate Research, 1987, 2:3, 73–81.
Glower, M. and P. H. Hendershott, The Determinants of REALTOR Income, Journal of
Real Estate Research, 1988, 3:2, 53–68.
1997 Real Estate Brokerage Industry Practices: Afﬁnity and Referral/Relocation
Relationships, National Association of Realtors, Washington, DC, April, 1998.
Sirmans, G. S. and D. A. Macpherson, Afﬁnity Programs Within the Florida Real Estate
Brokerage Industry, A Research Project Sponsored by the Education and Research
Foundation of the Florida Real Estate Commission, 2000.
Sirmans, G. S. and P. G. Swicegood, Determinants of Real Estate Licensee Income, Journal
of Real Estate Research, 1997, 14:1/2, 137–54.
——., Determining Real Estate Licensee Income, Journal of Real Estate Research, 2000,
20:1/2, 189–204.Affinity Programs and Real Estate Brokers  351
JRER  Vol. 22  No. 3 – 2001
Washington Real Estate Licensee Proﬁle: A Report to the Washington Real Estate
Commission by the Washington Center for Real Estate Research, Washington State
University, 1998.
This study was funded by the Education and Research Foundation Committee of the
Florida Real Estate Commission. The authors thank the anonymous referees for their
helpful comments.
G. Stacy Sirmans, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306–1110 or ssirman@
garnet.acns.fsu.edu.
David A. Macpherson, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306–1110 or
dmacpher@mailer.fsu.edu.